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Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding:
Italy’s International Obligations
ELISA VARI

Introduction
In February 2017, Italy entered into an agreement with Libya, the
Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter, “MoU”), whereby the two
countries committed to curbing what they referred to as “illegal
immigration” from the Libyan coast to Italy.1 While Italy is providing the
North African country with investments to further economic development
and stability as well as vessels and border security instruments, Libya is
intercepting boats of migrants at sea and preventing people from departing
its territory to reach Europe. The agreement also provides for funding for
Libyan detention centers and for other organizations engaging in the forced
as well as voluntary departure of migrants from the country.
The issues arising from this agreement are plenty. In recent years
alone, Libya has been under the scrutiny of non-governmental international
organizations due to its widespread human rights violations. Migrants in
particular are discriminated against, detained in dire conditions, and fall
prey to human traffickers and crime. In addition, Libya is reportedly, with
Italian support, sending migrants back to their countries of origin, without
any regard to their status or need for international protection, and without
ensuring that they will be safe if returned. Italy, along with the rest of the
international community, is well aware of these issues, yet shuts a blind eye
to Libya’s draconian measures in dealing with immigrants in order to avoid
taking the responsibility on itself.2
1. Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of development, the
fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking and fuel smuggling and on reinforcing
the security of borders between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic (2017),
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_
finalversion.doc.pdf.
2. See EU Shifting Rescue to Libya Risks Lives: Italy Should Direct Safe Rescues,
Human rights Watch (June 19, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/19/eushifting-rescue-libya-risks-lives (It was reported that a Libyan vessel fired against an Italian
vessel mistaking it for a boat of migrants, Italian authorities denied this happening).
105
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Libya is also controlled by different forces that are fighting to gain
more power and want to partake in the lucrative business provided by the
agreement. Officially, the parties to the MoU are the Italian government
and the UN-backed Government of National Accord (“GNA”) of Prime
Minister Fayez al-Serraj. The GNA is the internationally recognized
government of Libya and the entity controlling the country. In reality,
however, following the 42-year-long government of Muammar Gaddafi,
the country has been in a status of chaos, and several groups control
different cities and regions of the country, making it difficult for the GNA
to gain full control over Libya. These groups are armed militias, the
Islamic State, and the General National Congress (GNC), an Islamist-led
administration based in Tripoli challenging the GNA authority, though
some of its members have recognized it.3 The GNA is backed by the
Libyan National Army (LNA), which is supported by different units,
including some militias.4 Libyan militias are well known for engaging in
smuggling, human rights abuses and the organized crime that contributes to
Libyan instability. There have been allegations of Italy paying some of
them to take part to its fight against illegal immigration, which caused
further criticism of Italy’s conduct in the country.
While Italy is making sure to delegate the “dirty work” of pushing
away migrants to Libyan authorities and trying to prevent crossings into its
waters in order to circumvent international obligations, Italy may still be
held accountable under several international law instruments. Under the
Convention Against Torture,5 of which Italy is a party, not only should a
state not perpetrate the torture and degrading treatment of individuals, but it
also may not return such individuals to a country where they might suffer
the same abuses. The same principle, that of non-refoulement, is expressed
in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees6 and the
related 1967 Protocol. 7 While Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee
Convention or the 1967 Protocol, Italy ratified both legal instruments and is
thus bound by them. Both treaties forbid state parties from returning to
their countries of origin those who fear persecution at home on the basis of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
3. Guide to key Libyan militias, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-19744533.
4. Id.
5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 10 Dec. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (as modified by 24 I.L.M.
535 (1985)) (entered into force June, 26 1987).
6. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
7. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
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political opinion.
Because arguably Italy is not directly engaging in this conduct under
the agreement, and it is instead paying Libya (with EU support) to do that,
it might be difficult to prove its direct responsibility under CAT and the
Refugee Convention and Protocol. However, the International Law
Committee’s Articles for State Responsibility provide a legal framework,
which is widely accepted, that may serve to attach responsibility for these
acts to Italy due to its heavy financial and logistical contribution to Libya’s
international law violations.
This article will thus address, in Part 1, the relevant political and
historical background, including the recent history of the relations between
Italy and Libya in terms of migration control. Part 2 will then outline the
content of the latest agreement on the matter, and, lastly, Part 3 will
analyze Italy’s international obligations and the implications emerging
from the agreement that Italy should take into serious consideration while
implementing it. The note will also briefly discuss alternatives and
solutions that Italy should apply in order to avoid responsibility for human
rights and international law violations that is likely to attach otherwise.

1. Background
The Historical Context: Libya
Libya is currently in a situation of political confusion, which is very
much linked to a similarly unruly modern history. Italy colonized Libya in
the early 1900s and, during the almost forty-year-long occupation,
thousands of Libyans died, and indigenous populations were discriminated
against and largely excluded from the economy.8 When Italy left the
country in 1951, Libya was left in dire conditions, with high infant
mortality rates and widespread illiteracy. The discovery of oil that
followed brought more business into the country, but also corruption and
division, which resulted in the 1969 populist revolution. It was during the
revolution that Col. Moammar Gaddafi started gaining power, first leading
the popular revolution, then deposing the king with a military coup and
finally, once in power, restructuring the country’s politics and reshaping its
economy in an attempt to create a “stateless society.”
Gaddafi outlawed political parties and set up revolutionary
committees to repress opposition and further the regime’s will; private land
8. David S. Sorenson, A History of Modern Libya (reviewing DIRK VANDEWALLE A
HISTORY OF MODERN LIBYA 2006)); see also Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2 00609-01/history-modern- libya.
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was confiscated, and independent media was shut down.9 Creating
independent unions and practicing as private professionals became
impossible, and doctors, lawyers and others were forced to work for the
government.10 The government also gained complete control over imports,
exports and also food rations, which in turn spurred the creation of an
underground black market.11
Gaddafi’s radical agenda fueled opposition both inside and outside the
country. While the Libyan population was mostly concerned with its
leader’s draconian actions, the rest of the world saw the country as a
sponsor of terrorism. When the Arab Spring started, therefore, Gaddafi’s
government was not immune from popular upheaval, and, with NATO’s
intervention on the side of Libyans, Gaddafi’s government crumbled, and
he was killed shortly thereafter in 2011.12
Following Gaddafi’s ousting, Libya remains a country without a
government that has authority over its entire territory. Though elected and
internationally backed, the GNA struggles to keep a hold of the country,
while rival militias and the Islamist-led administration in Tripoli continue
to exert influence and power in large areas and towns across Libya, and
militias keep engaging in contraband, human trafficking, and smuggling of
migrants and supplies.13

Italy’s Immigration Dilemma
Italy has been the destination or way station of many migrants over
the past few decades. Immigrants have come mostly from North Africa,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, looking to either stay or to
make their way to wealthier northern European countries.14 Following the
Arab Spring, migration from North-African and Middle Eastern countries
to Europe has intensified, and Italy’s geographical position at the border of
the EU and right on the Mediterranean have made it one of the most
9. Karim Mezran, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, MIDDLE EAST POLICY
COUNCIL, http://www.mepc.org/libya-rise-and-fall-qaddafi.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Martin Asser, The Muammar Gaddafi Story, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12688033.
13. Floor El Kamouni-Janssen and Kars de Bruijne, CrisesAlert 3, Entering the Lion’s
Den: local militias and governance in Libya, CLINGENDAEL REPORT (2017), https://www.
clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/crisesalert-3-entering-the-lions-den-local-militi
as-and-governance-in-libya.pdf.
14. Angelo Scotto, From Emigration to Asylum Destination, Italy Navigates Shifting
Migration Tides, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.mig
rationpolicy.org/article/emigration-asylum-destination-italy-navigates-shifting-migrationtides.
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attractive ports of entry to the old continent.15 During 2015 and 2016,
335,000 irregular migrants reached Italy’s shores via the Mediterranean,
putting a strain on the Italian immigration system and contributing to the
recent European migration crisis.16
In 2013, following a shipwreck near the island of Lampedusa where
366 people died, Italy set up a Search And Rescue program, “Mare
Nostrum” (“Our Sea”), whereby the Italian Coast Guard and the Navy
helped and brought to its shores more than 160,000 migrants.17 The
program was praised internationally, so much that the EU took it over and
created Triton, a similar initiative whose primary purpose, however, is not,
like Mare Nostrum, to rescue migrants, but rather to monitor irregular
crossings over the Mediterranean.18
Italy has made commitments to refugees through its ratification of
international instruments. Other than creating the rescue system of Mare
Nostrum, Italy implemented policies and laws in accordance with
international conventions related to the protection of refugees once they
reach the Italian territory. Italy set up its national asylum system in 2001.
Those seeking to obtain refugee status may apply upon entry or at a police
station.19 The applicant is then interviewed to verify his or her identity and
whether he or she was in other EU states before entering Italy.20 Despite a
30-day term for a hearing to take place, applications often remain pending
for over thirty days, and up to 18 months.21 During this time, many asylum
seekers (particularly those who applied after being stopped by authorities in
the country or upon entry and found to be present illegally) remain in
detention for several months and receive little to no updates on the status of
their case.22 Once a decision is reached, an asylum-seeker may appeal
within 30 days, or 15 if he or she is in detention.23 About 30,000 people

15. Scotto, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Redazione Ansa, Da Mare Nostrum a Triton, le differenze, ANSA.IT, (Jul. 9,
2017, 6:03 PM), http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2015/04/19/da-mare-nostrum-a-trito
n-le- differenze_e5692d7c-0511-411e-a819-5393560575ba.html.
18. Id.
19. ASGI, Short Overview of the Asylum Procedure, Italy, AIDA Asylum Information
Database, http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/asylum-procedure/general/
short-overview-asylum-procedure.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Corallina Lopez Curzi, Come in Carcere, Ma Senza i Diritti dei Detenuti, OPEN
MIGRATION (June 9, 2017), https://openmigration.org/analisi/come-in-carcere-ma-senza-idiritti-dei-detenuti/; Refugee Law and Policy: Italy, Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/italy.php [last updated June 21, 2016].
23. ASGI, supra note 19.
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applied for asylum annually between 2000 and 2010.24
In response to the recent European refugee crisis in 2015, the Italian
public has displayed growing sentiments of xenophobia and racism, which
led populist and far-right parties to gather consensus by pushing an antiimmigration agenda.25 This motivated the left-wing Italian government to,
on the one hand, ask the EU and other member states for more cooperation
and support on migration, while, on the other hand, approving more
restrictive immigration policies.26 It is in this context that Italy struck a
deal with Libya to curb illegal immigration through the MoU, which some
argue was a way for the government to prove its strength and decisiveness
on the issue.

2. The Agreement
Italian-Libyan Cooperation: A Brief History
Italy and Libya initiated cooperation agreements on migration in the
early 2000s, pledging to fight terrorism, organized crime, drug-trafficking,
and illegal migration. Numerous similar agreements followed, many of
which are still unpublished.27 The most prominent agreements are the 2000
and 2003 agreements, the 2006 Memorandum for the cooperation against
illegal migration, the 2007 Protocol and Additional Protocol to the 2006
Memorandum, the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and
Cooperation, the 2009 Executive Agreement, and, lastly, the 2017
Memorandum of Understanding.
As part of their first bilateral agreement of December 2000, the two
countries committed to assisting each other in the effort to curb irregular
migration and exchanging information.28 In 2003, Libya and Italy defined
in more details how to operationalize the 2000 agreement. Neither the
2000 nor the 2003 agreement were published.29
In 2006, the countries signed a Memorandum for the cooperation

24. Scotto, supra note 14.
25. Id.; see also Patrick Strickland, How Italy’s Far Right Exploits the Migration
Crisis, AL-JAZEERA (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/italy-exploitsmigration-crisis-180114200719130.html.
26. Scotto, supra note 14.
27. Mariagiulia Giuffré, State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for
Italy’s Push Backs to Libya?, 24 INTL. JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 692, 692-734 (2012).
28. Accordo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare
Socialista per la Collaborazione nella Lotta al Terrorismo, alla Criminalità Organizzata, al
Traffico Illegale di Stupefacenti e Sostanze Psicotrope e All’Immigrazione Clandestina
(Rome, 13 Dec 2000).
29. Giuffré, supra note 27.
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against illegal migration which then resulted in the 2007 Protocol and
Additional Protocol.30 Libya and Italy reaffirmed the commitments made
in 2000 and established a joint mission whereby Libya would patrol its
coastline and international waters, while Italy would supply it with vessels
on a temporary basis.31 One year later, in 2008, the countries signed a
Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (hereinafter “TFPC”) in
Tripoli,32 and in 2009 they signed an executive agreement to enforce the
2007 Protocol.33
The 2007 Protocol and Additional Protocol entrusted Libyan
authorities with large control over maritime missions, with Italian officials
joining Libyan authorities on board only to provide training and give
technical support. Libyan authorities would intercept boats of migrants and
take them back to its coast prior to reaching Italian territorial waters,
relieving Italy from exercising legal authority over those returned to
Libya.34 Therefore, Italy would avoid either taking the migrants it stopped
into its territory, or returning them to Libya and facing the possibility of
breaching its international obligations.35 What was Libya to do with those
halted and returned to its territory, however, was not specified.
The 2008 TFPC reiterated the two countries’ relationship generally.
Italy and Libya agreed to move past old hostilities, most notably the
suffering caused to Libya by Italian colonization.36 They also agreed to
engage in regional cooperation, and Italy committed itself to bringing
investments and substantial financing to Libya.37 The countries also
reaffirmed principles such as respect for sovereign equality, prohibition of
the threat or use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for
human rights (Art. 6 of the TFPC) and fundamental freedoms.38
Within the TFPC chapter regarding partnership and immigration, Art.
19 committed the parties to collaborating to prevent illegal immigration in
30. Protocollo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica
Popolare Socialista (Tripoli, 29 Dec 2007); Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo al
Protocollo di Cooperazone tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica
Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno dell′immigrazione Clandestina (Tripoli,
29 Dec 2007).
31. Id.; see also Natalino Ronzitti, The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and
Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the
Mediterranean?, 1 BULLETIN OF ITALIAN POLITICS, 125, 125-133 (2009).
32. Trattato di Amicizia, Partenariato, e Cooperazione (Bengazi, 30 Aug 2008),
ratified by Italy with Law No. 2009/7 (TFPC).
33. Giuffré, supra note 27.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Ronzitti, supra note 31.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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the countries of origin of the migratory flows through bilateral and regional
initiatives, such as the patrolling of the Libyan coast by mixed crews on
boats provided by Italy, and the implementation of a satellite detection
system to control Libyan land borders financed by Italy and the EU.39
Through the 2009 Executive Protocol40 enforcing the 2007 Protocol
and Additional Protocol, Italy started supplying Libya with six Italian
vessels on a permanent basis, making Libya’s participation on illegal
immigration control more proactive and paving the way for push-back
practices.41 Most notably, none of these protocols and agreements made
the important distinction between asylum seekers and other irregular
migrants.42 This relationship was temporarily suspended in 2012, due to
the outbreak of a civil war in Libya and the ECtHR judgement Hirsi et al.
v. Italy condemning the interception and return of migrants to Libya by
Italy (explored further below).43

The 2017 Memorandum of Understanding
The current agreement, which is the object of this note, was finalized
in February 2017 as the Memorandum of Understanding, and is meant to
extend and incorporate the commitments made in the 2008 TFPC.44
According to the MoU, Italy will be providing Libyan authorities with
training and equipment, while also investing to help Libya improve border
security and combat smuggling of people, and engage the Libyan
government in smuggling hubs.45
The document is three pages long, and includes eight articles. The
first two articles iterate the two countries’ commitments and encourage
starting cooperation efforts in accordance with the 2008 TFPC. In Art. 1,
39. Ronzitti, supra note 31.
40. Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo concernente l’aggiunta di un articolo al
Protocollo firmato a Tripoli il 29/12/2007 tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria
Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno dell′immigrazione
clandestina (Tripoli, 4 Feb 2009).
41. Giuffré, supra note 27.
42. Id.
43. Anja Palm, The Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding: The baseline of a
policy approach aimed at closing all doors to Europe?, ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI
(Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/italy-libya-memorandum-understandingbaseline-policy-approach-aimed-closing-all-doors.
44. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 1 (The introduction to the MoU
recites “In order to implement the relevant agreements undersigned by the Parties, among
which the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in Bengasi on August
30th 2008 — in particular with respect to Article 19 of the same Treaty —, and the Tripoli
Declaration of January 21st 2012 as well as other agreements and memoranda on the
subject.”).
45. Id.
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Italy promises financial investments in the areas affected by illegal
migration for industries such as renewable energy and infrastructure so as
to create new jobs and substitute smuggling as a source of revenue. Italy
also promised technical support to Libyan institutions that work on curbing
illegal migration. Art. 2 has the parties commit to completing the land
border control satellite detection system as foreseen in Art. 19 of the TFPC.
Under the same article, Italy also agrees to finance existing “hosting
centers” for migrants and to supply them with medical equipment. Both
parties commit to ensuring that Libyan personnel in the hosting centers is
trained to “face illegal immigrants’ conditions.” They also commit to
adopting a “wider and more complete Euro-African cooperation view, to
eliminate the causes of irregular immigration,” supporting countries of
origin and improving their life standards and employment rates. Both
parties agree to support organizations in Libya that return migrants to their
country of origin, “including voluntary return.”46 Lastly, they will start
development programs in Libya to create jobs and income and replace
contraband and human trafficking that militias and irregular local groups
largely benefit from.47
Art. 3 encourages the creation of a committee to oversee the
implementation of the agreement, Art. 4 deals with the financing, Art. 5
iterates the parties’ commitment to interpret and apply the MoU in
accordance with international and human rights obligations. The last three
articles deal with the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms and other
procedural matters. The overall language of the MoU is broad and
sometimes legally imprecise.48 Certain issues, such as what projects
exactly the agreement is meant to support and how much funds Italy is
supposed to provide and where they would come from, are really unclear.49
The MoU fails, just like its predecessors, to ever distinguish asylum seekers
from economic and other irregular migrants.50
Although the agreement does not specify whether Libyan authorities
should intercept migrants already en route to Italy and at sea, this goal can
be inferred from the fact that Italy will be providing Libya with boats and
border control systems “in order to stem the illegal migrants’ fluxes” (Art.
1). It is equally likely that, in order for Italy to avoid any responsibility
under international law, Libya will be intercepting boats before they reach
46. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 1.
47. Declan Walsh and Jason Horowitz, Italy, Going it Alone, Stalls the Flow of
Migrants. But at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html.
48. Palm, supra note 43.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Italian territorial waters. In addition, there are already reports of Libyan
authorities and border patrol agents intercepting in Libyan waters migrants’
boats traveling to Italy.51 Furthermore, by mentioning funding for
organizations in Libya that engage in the return (whether voluntary or
forcible) of migrants to their country of origin, Art. 2 of the MoU explicitly
identifies forcible returns (refoulement) as one of its main goals.52
Therefore, though the agreement does not speak precisely as to what Libya
is to do with the migrants it intercepts, it seems clear that the ultimate goal
is to detain and eventually return migrants to their countries of origin,
especially given Italy’s commitment to finance detention centers and
support organizations that facilitate migrants’ return to their country of
origin.53 The agreement never mentions actions to identify potential
refugees among the migrants or to ensure that those returned are headed to
a safe country, despite Italy being party, as previously mentioned, to
several human rights conventions that oblige it to take these steps.
All in all, the MoU is focused on curbing migration flows to Italy and
supporting development in Libya, and, while the operations mentioned
point at efforts to stem flows of migrants from Libya to Europe, it looks
like a lot of attention is directed towards securing Libya’s borders to stop
that phenomenon from the outset, no matter the costs.54
In the past few years, Italy has been more and more vocal regarding its
need for a solution to the heavy fluxes of migrants crossing the
Mediterranean to reach its borders. As previously mentioned, the country
has been praised on several occasions for its rescue operations, which have
saved countless lives at sea.55 However, Italy continued to stress that it
could not bear the burden of helping and taking illegal migrants in such
large numbers, and called for the EU to provide a durable solution in many
occasions.56
In response to the recent “refugee crisis” and to the “border
51. Libya: European governments complicit in horrific abuses of refugees and
migrants, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, (Dec. 12, 2017, 00:01 AM[Double check the time; or
delet time]), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/12/ libya-european-governmentscomplicit-in-horrific-abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants/; see also More than 300 migrants
intercepted in boats off Libya: coastguard, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2018, 9:58 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya/more-than-300-migrants-intercep
ed-in-boats-off-libya-coastguard-idUSKCN1G31XJ.
52. Palm, supra note 43.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Steve Scherer and Massimiliano di Giorgio, Italy to end sea rescue mission that
saved 100,000 migrants, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-italy-migrants-eu/italy-to-end-sea-rescue-mission-that-saved-100000-migrants-id
USKBN0IK22220141031.
56. Id.
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countries’” cry for help, the EU struck a contentious deal with Turkey, that,
similar to the agreement between Italy and Libya, attempts at moving
border control efforts away from the EU territory, so as to avoid the
international and EU obligations that come from receiving migrants – and
particularly asylum seekers.57 Border externalization efforts have been a
common phenomenon in recent years, whereby agreements are made
between a state trying to avoid immigration influxes and a third state that
agrees to keep migrants within its territory and “take care” of them.58 This
is due to the presumption that the former state would then be freed of all
international obligations towards the people who remain in the third
country.59 However, as discussed below, this is not necessarily the case.
According to the EU-Turkey deal, asylum seekers and irregular
migrants who reached Greece could be returned to Turkey, and, in
exchange, Turkey received € 6 billion to assist refugees as well as travel
visas for Turkish nationals.60 This deal is problematic for several reasons.
Primarily, Turkey has been accused of failing to provide adequate
assistance to refugees, since, despite being party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention and 1967 Protocol, it only offers temporary protection rather
than full refugee status.61 In addition, in transferring asylum seekers from
Greece to Turkey, the EU has been effectively engaging in the refoulement
of refugees. EU law prohibits this conduct, except where refugees are
returned to a “safe country.” Obviously, the EU is justifying its actions by
claiming that Turkey is in fact a safe country, but the reception of migrants
and refugees in Turkey seem to show that this assumption is flawed.62
Under the deal, the EU also promised that it would eventually provide a
safe, legal way out of Turkey for refugees to come to Europe. In reality,

57. See, e.g., Bill Frelick, Iam M. Kysel, and Jennifer Podkul, The Impact of
Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants,
HUMAN RIGHTS WAATCH (Dec. 6 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2016/12/06/impact-externalization- migration-controls-rights-asylum-seekers-andother-migrants.
58. See Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul, supra note 57 (for more details of externalization
of migration controls).
59. Giuffré, supra note 27; see also Palm, supra note 43.
60. Kondylia Gogou, The EU-Turkey Deal: Europe’s Year of Shame, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 20, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/
2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/.
61. Turkey, UNHCR Global Appeal 2008-2009, 304-307, http://www.unhcr.org/
474ac8e60.pdf; http://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey; see also
Gogou, supra note 60.
62. Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, MIGRATION
POLICY INSTITUTE (Mar. 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkeyrefugee-deal; Gogou, supra note 60.
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the number of those transferred to EU territory remained small.63
Because the MoU seeks to enforce migration control mechanisms
beyond the EU borders, it has been compared to the EU-Turkey deal, but it
appears as a “bad replica” of it.64 In fact, while the Turkey deal at least
included resettlement operations, no such commitment made it to the MoU.
As already mentioned, the MoU also does not mention the words ‘refugee’
or ‘legal migration,’ but instead uses the blanket term “illegal
immigration.”65 Further, while the EU-Turkey deal mapped funding
amounts, projects and partners in detail, this clarity is lacking in the MoU,
which very vaguely mentions EU funds and Italian funding for the various
projects of the memorandum.66 Lastly, the political and human rights
situation in Libya, as this paper will discuss, is far worse than the one in
Turkey. The agreement’s promise to uphold international and human rights
obligations is no guarantee. While the UNHCR is active in Turkey,
refugees in Libya cannot apply for protection with the government, which
does not have an asylum system in place, nor with the UN agency, which
has had troubles operating in the country.67 The lack of a legal framework
ensuring refugee protection, according to observers, will likely result in
Libya engaging in chain-refoulement.68
The existing legal framework on immigration in the country, in fact,
fails to distinguish between people seeking international protection and all
other migrants.69 Instead, it categorizes every person who enters in
violation of migration provisions as an illegal migrant and criminalizes
such conduct.70 The penalty for entering illegally, according to a rough
translation of the relevant laws, is imprisonment and forced labor or a fine
or both; after serving their sentence, illegal migrants will then be

63. Gogou, supra note 60 (“As of 27 February 2017, the number of Syrian refugees
transferred from Turkey to EU member states was 3,565 – a number made even more
negligible when contrasted against the 2.8 million Syrians currently in Turkey.”).
64. Palm, supra note 43; see also Katie Kuschminder, Why the EU Plan to Stop
Mediterranean Migration is a Human Rights Concern, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2017,
09:39 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/libya-is-not-turkey-why-the-eu-plan-tostop-mediterranean_us_58a7b075e4b0b0e1e0e20b0b.
65. Palm, supra note 43.
66. Id.
67. Kuschminder, supra note 64.
68. Palm, supra note 43.
69. See Libya Immigration Detention, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT (last updated:
Feb. 2015), https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/libya. (In 2004, the
European Commission observed that “detainees were arrested at random and issued
deportation orders based on decisions made for groups of nationalities, rather than
individual cases.”).
70. Id.
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expelled.71 There seems to be no specific legal provision on administrative
immigration detention for immigration reasons, so detention for conduct
that is not criminal is imposed without a judicial order and legal process;
observers argue that immigration detention occurs in a “legal vacuum” and,
most times, arbitrarily.72 Moreover, the existing laws seem to imply that
detention may be of indefinite length.73 Technically, the country’s Ministry
of Interior’s Department for Combating Illegal Immigration (DCIM) is the
authority in charge of Libya’s detention facilities; however, since the
ousting of Gaddafi, militias have taken control over several of these
facilities.74
Refugee International, an international NGO working on refugee and
migration issues, interviewed several migrants in Tunisia and Italy who had
been detained or held captive in Libya by smugglers and law
enforcement.75 The report produced by the organization shows that the
people returned to Libya or who enter Libya illegally and are captured are
put into detention with no legal recourse or judicial hearing, they are held
for months in conditions that lead many to die out of illnesses, where
sexual abuse of both women and men is widespread, and where no
protection is available for those seeking asylum.76 Migrants are usually
threatened and subject to extortion, forced to pay smugglers affiliated with
local militias (or police officers, but there seems to be little difference
between the two categories in practice) only to be able to get to the next
step to reach Europe, if they are lucky.77 For these and other reasons that
this note will analyze, the MoU between Italy and Libya raised a series of
concerns.

Aftermath of the MoU
In the first ten days of August 2017 alone, experts observed a drop in
migrant crossings of the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy of 76%
compared to August of the previous year.78 In November 2017, the
Committee Against Torture considered the fifth and sixth periodic reports
submitted by Italy regarding its implementation and compliance with the
71. GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Izza Leghtas, “Hell on Earth”: Abuses Against Refugees and Migrants Trying to
Reach Europe from Libya, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL (2017), https://www.refugees
international.org/reports/2017/libya.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment (“CAT”), which will be discussed below. In its discussion with
Italy, the Committee asked the party to justify this significant drop in the
number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean from Libya and it asked
whether the drop was connected to the MoU.79 The Italian representatives
asserted that the decrease in crossings was due to the “stabilization”
accomplished by Libya with Italy’s help, and also to Italy’s ongoing
dialogue with countries of origin of the migratory flows.
Some experts believe, however, that there are less people willing to
cross the Mediterranean from Libya, and it is unclear why.80 For example,
there has been a significant drop in individuals migrating to Libya from
Niger, due, allegedly, to anti-smuggling deals that Niger entered into with
neighboring countries and the EU.81 These deals prompted Niger to pass
laws against migrant smuggling, and to increase arrests of smugglers and
vehicle confiscations, thus reducing the number of those leaving its
territory.82 The Libyan coastguard trained by Italy turning back 60% of
ships leaving the Libyan coast, however, remains a major factor of the
decrease in the number of crossings.
Following the agreement, Italy has been accused of paying Libyan
militias to provide additional control over migration fluxes, negotiating
with them through mayors and local leaders to secure their support.83
Militias in Libya are composed of numerous armed groups organized in
coalitions in order to exert influence over a given territory. Their interests
vary so much over time that it is difficult to discern and divide militias
based on their goals and objectives.84 Similarly, these groups cannot be

79. OHCHR, Committee Against Torture considers report of Italy (Nov. 15, 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22399&LangID
=E.
80. Jacopo Barigazzi, Italy sees unexpected reduction of Mediterranean Migration
Flows, POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-seesunexpected-reduction-in-mediterranean-migration-flows/.
81. Id.
82. Peter Tinti, In Niger, anti-smuggling efforts risk trading one crisis for another,
AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (Jan. 13, 2017), http://africanarguments.org/2017/01/13/in-niger-antismuggling-efforts-risk-trading-one-crisis-for-another/.
83. Matthew Herbert and Jalel Harchaoui, Italy claims it’s found a solution to
Europe’s migrant problem. Here’s why Italy’s wrong, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/25/italy-claims-its-founda-solution-to-europes-migrant-problem-heres-why-italys-wrong/?utm_term=.
42e3781b8114; see also Mark Micallef and Tuesday Reitano, The anti-human smuggling
business and Libya’s political end game, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/human-smuggling-and- libyas-political-end-game.
84. El Kamouni-Janssen and de Bruijne, supra note 13.
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narrowly categorized as criminal, government allied, or irregular.85 In fact,
“many militias wear different hats at the same time,” defending different
interests and siding with different parties, and ultimately “overruling any
political actors.”86
For these reasons, the sudden cooperation between different rival
militias across Libya that was observed after June 2017 raised suspicions,
and it was suggested that it was caused by a deal struck with the Italian
Security Services.87 If this is true, this means that the smugglers who were
previously paid by migrants to cross the Mediterranean are now being paid
by Italy to prevent that same conduct. While Italy denies these claims,
militias have practically become part of the GNA security forces.88 This
seems to not only give irregular militant groups legitimacy, but to also
hinder the GNA’s efforts to integrate the country’s security sector, as while
some of the militias are considered part of the official security forces, they
continue to pursue their agenda, smuggling subsidized fuel and other
produces.89
The number of crossings started rising again in September, and
observers connected this rise with a power struggle between rival gangs
and militias in Sabratha, one of Libya’s main human-trafficking ports.
Sabratha, located in the northwest part of the country and facing the
Mediterranean, has allegedly been for years the point of departure of
smugglers. Several factions operate in the area, mainly the Dabbashi gang,
which has profited for years from smuggling people, as well as fuel, across
the Mediterranean.90 When boats stopped leaving the port, the gang
claimed it had agreed with the GNA Interior Ministry to put off its
smuggling activities in return for money.91 However, this has caused
power struggles and fights between the Dabbashi Clan and rival groups that
also want to take part in the profitable business provided by the Italy-Libya
deal.92 In addition, the migrants who are prevented from leaving are
instead often locked up in detention centers controlled by militias.93
85. El Kamouni-Janssen and de Bruijne, supra note 13.
86. Id.
87. Micallef and Reitano, supra note 83.
88. Id.
89. Herbert and Harchaoui, supra note 83.
90. Walsh and Horowitz, supra note 47.
91. Id.; see also Patrick Wintour, Italy’s Deal to Stem Flow of People from Libya in
Danger of Collapse, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/italys-deal-to-stem-flow-of-people-from-libya-indanger-of-collapse.
92. Wintour, supra at 91.
93. Aidan Lewis and Steve Scherer, Exclusive: Armed Group Stopping Migrant Boats
Leaving Libya, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2017, 9:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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Despite the allegations that Italy is paying and making deals with
militias, the Italian government has repeatedly stated that, other than
offering medical supplies and other forms of assistance, it has not directly
paid these groups to carry out operations to curb immigration, but solely
the Libyan government.94 Still, Italy is financing the GNA that is in turn
entering into deals with irregular militias and paying them to accomplish
the goals under the MoU.95
Gen. Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army, claims he
has been in touch with Italian authorities trying to get a piece of the pie: he
could control the southern border of the country if Europe delivers money
and security supplies.96 Haftar also openly criticized Italy’s engagement
with these groups, because “[p]aying them means entering a vicious
circle.97 Tomorrow they will fight one another for the rewards and then ask
for more money. It will lead to infinite blackmail.”98 Observers are also
skeptical as to the reliability of these groups, as the GNA has very little
control over them and, in the past, they have tended to adapt and find new
smuggling routes to continue their activities.99
The MoU was challenged in both Libya and Italy by different refugee
rights and political groups. In Libya, the Tripoli Court of Appeal
temporarily suspended the agreement due to humanitarian concerns and
constitutional ones. On the one hand, the agreement was not unanimously
approved by the House of Representatives and the State Council, meaning
that al-Serraj did not have the authority to make this agreement.100 On the
other hand, there was concern over the risk of migrants staying in Libya
and being detained in centers funded by Italy.101 The suspension, however,
did not last long, and the Libyan Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s
ruling.102
Last September, the Italian Radical Party brought a lawsuit to the
europe-migrants-libya-italy-exclusive/exclusive-armed-group-stopping-migrant-boats-leav
ing-libya-idUSKCN1B11XC.
94. Walsh and Horowitz, supra note 47; see also Wintour, supra at 91.
95. Walsh and Horowitz, supra note 47.
96. Wintour, supra at 91.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Lewis and Scherer, supra note 93.
100. Abdulkader Assad, Court ruling blocks Libya-Italy MoU on stemming illegal
immigration, LIBYA OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://www.libyaobserver.ly/
news/court-ruling-blocks-libya-italy-mou-stemming-illegal-immigration; see also Tripoli
Appeals Court suspends Libyan-Italian MoU temporarily, LIBYAN EXPRESS (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://www.libyanexpress.com/tripoli-appeals-court-suspends-libyan-italian-moutemporarily/.
101. Assad, supra note 100.
102. Palm, supra note 43.
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Republic’s Procura (the public prosecutor’s office) challenging the
constitutionality of the agreement, as Art. 80 of the Italian Constitution
requires international agreements to be ratified by the Parliament.103 In
addition, Asgi (the Italian Association for Juridical Studies) petitioned
before the Latium Administrative Tribunal to block the deal, claiming that
the government is misplacing funds by providing Libyan authorities with
training and equipment and enabling the violation of fundamental human
rights.104 In March 2017, the Libyan PM al-Serraj presented a list to Italy
with all the funding and supplies he expects Libyan authorities to be
provided with in accordance with the MoU. The list includes ten vessels,
ten patrol boats, four helicopters, twenty-four rafts, ten ambulances, thirty
jeeps, fifteen cars, thirty satellite phones, and other items, which amount to
a total of 800 million euros.105 The money is allocated from the Italiangovernment-issued African Fund,106 which was meant to promote
development initiatives to improve cooperation with African states that are
of great importance to migration routes.107 This goal, Asgi argues, is very
distant from the projects that would be financed in Libya, that is border
patrolling and fighting migrant trafficking.108
For its part, in line with its approach in Turkey, the EU has backed
Italy’s efforts in Libya, but has let Italy take the lead in the accord.109 The
EU also expressed support for the Libyan PM al-Serraj, as well as for the
militias running some of the detention centers in the country, though EU
officials have denied, just as Italy did, any funding from the EU going to
militias.110 Italy was instead strongly criticized for the agreement by the
103. Denuncia Querela, RADICALI.IT (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.radicali.it/wp-conte
nt/uploads/2017/09/Esposto-Libia-PDF.pdf.
104. Depositato il ricorso di ASGI contro lo sviamento di 2,5 milioni di euro dal c.d.
Fondo Africa, ASGI (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/
libia-italia-ricorso-fondi-cooperazione/.
105. Annalisa Camilli, Perché l’accordo tra Italia e Libia sui migranti è sotto accusa,
INTERNAZIONALE (Nov. 24, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/anna
lisa-camilli/2017/11/29/italia-libia-migranti-accordo.
106. For the original text of the law approving the African Fund, see Legge 11
dicembre 2016, n.232, G.U. Dec. 21, 2016, n.297 (It.), http://www.assocostieri.it/
normativa/ LF%202017.pdf.
107. ASGI, supra note 104.
108. Id.; see Fondo Africa, quelle risorse destinate progetti lontani dall’aiuto allo
sviluppo, REPUBBLICA (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/cooperazione/
2017/12/18/news/fondo_africa-184514509/ (for more information on the African Fund and
its use in Libya).
109. Gabriela Baczynska, EU sticks to Libya strategy on migrants, despite human
rights concerns, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/useurope-migrants-libya-italy/eu-sticks-to-libya-strategy-on-migrants-despite-human-rights-co
ncerns-idUSKCN1BP2CQ.
110. Id.
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international community due to the widespread human rights violations
perpetrated by Libyan authorities at sea and within the country. Most
importantly, because of the large amount of assistance that Italy is giving
Libya in perpetrating these actions, it seems unlikely that Italy will escape
scrutiny by international observers regarding its obligations under
international law.

3. Italy’s International Obligations
Italy and the Convention Against Torture
Italy ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in 1989. CAT defined torture as:
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”111
Further, it established that state parties may not “expel, return, or
extradite to a State where there are grounds to believe the individual
returned will be subjected to torture.”112 Art. 3 further states that “in
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall
take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable,
the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” These provisions were finally
incorporated in Italian law only last year in July in art.613-bis of the Penal
Code. UN officials and observers, however, have taken the position that
art.613-bis is incomplete and not fully in compliance with the Convention.
Observers claim that, for example, the torture definition requires verifiable
psychological damages — but how do you verify these damages when
court proceedings may occur years after torture was inflicted on the
victim?113 Still, Italy has been bound by CAT principles well before
111. Convention Against Torture, supra note 5, art. 1.
112. Id. art. 3.
113. Claudio Francavilla, Italy’s New Law on Torture Fails to Meet International
Standards, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 11, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/

6. Vari - HICLR Vol.43-1.docx

Winter 2020]

11/12/2019 11:20 AM

Italy’s International Obligations

123

enacting art.613-bis, since the prohibition of torture has the force of jus
cogens and at the very least customary international law.114
In any case, the MoU obviously seems at the very least in contrast
with the underlying principles of CAT, that is, protecting individuals from
torture and degrading treatment. In fact, the agreement purports to fund
Libyan detention centers and keep migrants within the Libyan borders, but
numerous international organizations have reported over time that the
detention conditions in Libya are far too appalling, and that the treatment of
migrants in the country in general is degrading. According to the IOM,
about 416,566 migrants were on Libyan territory by the end of September
2017, and about 20,000 were in detention around November 2017.115
Despite Libya ratifying CAT, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reports
that migrants in Libya are detained arbitrarily, with no recourse to the legal
system, in conditions that fall well below appropriate health and safety
standards.116 Cells are small to the point that people cannot stretch out at
night, malnutrition is widespread due to food shortages, and detention
conditions are generally so squalid as to cause or at least contribute to
illnesses and infections.117 “Detainees are stripped of any human dignity,
exposed to abusive treatment and lack adequate access to medical care,”
asserted a medical advisor for MSF.118 Overcrowding, poor ventilation,
and limited natural light add to the already grim conditions of detention
centers.119 Other issues are the physical abuse perpetrated by detention
centers’ staff against detainees and the endemic racism that causes further
mistreatment of black migrants.120 One woman told Amnesty International
that a pregnant woman in detention was beaten to death by Libyan
officials.121
news/2017/07/11/italys-new-law-torture-fails-meet-international-standards.
114. “[T]here is widespread agreement among scholars that the prohibition against
official torture has achieved the status of a jus cogens norm.” Siderman de Blake v. Republic
of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992).
115. Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-Bound Refugees and
Migrants, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2017).
116. Libya Must End Arbitrary Detention of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Migrants,
DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/
libya-must-end-arbitrary-detention-refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Libya: horrific abuse driving migrants to risk lives in Mediterranean crossings,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (May 11, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/pressreleases/2015/05/libya-horrific-abuse-driving-migrants-to-risk-lives-in-mediterraneancrossings/;
see
also
Global
Detention
Project,
supra
note
69.
https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/libya
121. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120.
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In November 2017, CNN published a video showing two migrants in
Tripoli being sold as slaves for the equivalent of 800 US dollars.122 One of
them was being auctioned to work on a farm.123 CNN was told of nine
different locations across Libya where slave auctions were supposedly
occurring.124 In many cases, those sold as slaves end up being forced into
prostitution and sexual exploitation in order to be released by their
smugglers, or die while crossing the desert en route to Europe killed either
by thirst or by their captors.125 Following the CNN report, the Libyan
government initiated investigations on the matter.126
As previously mentioned, the Committee Against Torture recently
considered Italy’s fifth and sixth reports on its compliance with CAT.127
Together with other considerations related to the Convention, the
Committee addressed the MoU, and reminded the state party that despite its
obligations to Libya under the agreement, Italy could not disregard its
international human rights obligations.128 The Committee also highlighted
the fact that the UN Support Mission to Libya showed extensively that
conditions suffered by migrants in Libyan detention centers and in the
country generally are extremely reprehensible and appalling.129
In response to the Committee’s concerns, the Italian representatives
stressed that the agreement is a memorandum of understanding and
therefore not binding, and, because the plans under the agreement were
developed “hand in hand” with the European Commission, the EU could
decide to end the project at any time.130 The representatives stressed that
Italy had voiced its concerns for human rights violations in Libya “in every

122. Nima Elbagir, Raja Razek, Alex Platt and Bryony Jones, People for Sale, Where
Lives are Auctioned for $400, CNN (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/
africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Ali Younes, African refugees bought, sold and murdered in Libya, AL-JAZEERA
(Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/african-refugees-bought-sold-mu
rdered-libya-171129103602048.html.
126. Elbagir et al., supra note 122.
127. OHCHR, supra note 79.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Although it is unclear how much control the EU effectively exerts over this
particular deal, “both the European Union and Italy have a history of seeking partnerships
with Libya, offering millions of euros in foreign aid, equipment, and training in order to,
among other things, combat illegal migration at the point of departure.” Zara Rabinovitch,
Pushing Out the Boundaries of Humanitarian Screening with In-Country and Offshore
Processing, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.migrationpolicy.or
g/article/pushing-out-boundaries-humanitarian-screening-country-and-offshore-processing;
see also OHCHR, supra note 79.
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forum,” and it had asked of all stakeholders to participate in developing
better detention conditions in the country.131 The representatives believed
that just because Libya is in a difficult situation that should not prevent
Italy from carrying out initiatives in cooperation with the EU to fight
smuggling and human trafficking and provide the necessary instruments for
Libya to address the situation.132 The Italian delegation reiterated that Italy
is taking a comprehensive approach to foster development in the country,
which would in turn provide jobs for migrants.133 It also noted that the
financial support provided “ha[s] to go hand in hand with efforts to provide
adequate conditions for migrants,” and that humanitarian assistance for
migrants was one of the pillars of the EU efforts in the country.134
The Committee noted, however, that in promoting Italy’s plan in
Libya, the EU was really trying to transfer its border control to Libya.135 It
also suggested that the drop in the number of crossings were in reality a
result of Italy’s effort to “farm out” the problem of illegal migration and of
the increased number of migrants detained in Libya, not of the stability
brought in Libya, as Italy claimed.136 In fact, the Committee expressed its
concerns over reports of smugglers being paid to keep migrants in the
country. One Committee expert reminded Italy that the EU was yet to do
something on the inhumane detention conditions in Libya, expressed that
“[s]omething was not working in the implementation of Italy’s cooperation
agreement with Libya, which has assumed the role of an external border of
the EU.”137 The expert further asked if Italy was unable to demand that
Libya upheld human rights in its detention centers, and if it could move
from denouncing the violations to acting on them. “Italy ha[s] to review its
migration and cooperation policies, and its legal responsibilities.”138
The delegation responded that two thirds of the funding provided to
Libya focused on the respect of human rights and assistance to migrants,
and that a monitoring committee will observe whether conditions appear
deficient. If so, the European Commission would be able to suspend the
project in the country.139 In response to the Committee’s accusations that
the agreement is an instrument for border externalization, the
representatives noted that the “concept of moving borders [runs] counter to

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

OHCHR, supra note 79.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the principle of national sovereignty,” maybe in an attempt to indicate that
border externalization is not among Italy’s goals.140 Further, all the
operations intercepting migrant boats at sea had been conducted by Libya
within its national waters, without Italy’s assistance, and were therefore
outside of Italy’s control.141
Despite Italy’s displayed openness to dialogue on the matter and its
claims before the Committee, the fact remains that nowhere in the MoU did
Italy condition its funds on Libya’s compliance with human rights, and, as
the expert on the Committee asserted, neither Italy nor the EU have done
anything so far to ensure compliance.142 That Libyan authorities continue
to engage in human rights violations is well-known, yet the agreement is
still standing. Further, that Italy is not in control of what Libyan border
patrol officials do in Libyan waters seems like a very weak argument when
Italy is directly providing Libya with the funds to conduct its sea
operations. Lastly, it is clear that the principle of national sovereignty
ceases to be so pressing when a country feels it is able to surrender its
international responsibilities by transferring its border control to another
country.
Libya is quite clearly engaged in violations of CAT, in that it is
detaining individuals under degrading conditions in violation of Art. 1 of
the Convention, and returning them to their countries of origin where there
is a high likelihood they will be harmed.143 Libya could ascertain if
migrants will be harmed if returned by, as prescribed under Art.3, verifying
whether there is a pattern of gross, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the
countries it is sending migrants back to. Instead, where it is not detaining
them, Libya is returning migrants to their country of origin without first
making sure that they are not going to be persecuted or harmed once they
are sent back.144 Libya’s conduct has already been largely criticized, and
NGOs operating in the country keep reporting on the human rights abuses
perpetuated by Libyan authorities.145
140. OHCHR, supra note 79.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. UNHCR, UNHCR concerned over continued forcible return of potential refugees
from Libya, UNHCR (Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/414ffeb4c.html; see also Libya
to allow emergency repatriation of refugees, AL-JAZEERA (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/libya-slavery-scandal-overshadows-eu-africasummit-171130113648779.html; see also Libya: Stemming the Flow, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (2016), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/libya 0906/libya0906webwcover.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Italy/Libya: Migrants Describe Forced Return, Abuse, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Sept. 21, 2009, 4:45 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/21/italy/libya-migrantsdescribe-forced-returns-abuse; see also Amnesty International, supra note 51.
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As to Italy, while CAT alone might be insufficient to challenge Italy’s
conduct of aiding Libyan violations to an international forum, Amnesty
International condemned the “de facto complicity or participation of Italian
authorities in the torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of
refugees and migrants in Libya as a result of its cooperation with Libyan
authorities on border control.”146 In fact, the Convention may still serve as
the basis to hold Italy responsible under the concept of state responsibility,
as we will see later on.

Protection of Refugees and the Principle of Non-Refoulement
Italy is a party to both international treaties on refugees, that are the
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. These
treaties established the existence of a protected category of migrants,
identified as refugees, which includes those who:
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.”147
Refugees are entitled to special protections under international law
that “economic migrants” (those seeking a better job or life based on
economic reasons) and others (migrants that do not fall under the refugee
definition) do not have. The principle of non-refoulement is one of the
most important protections afforded to refugees, but it is also expressed in
Art. 3 of CAT, and thus not limited to them. This principle was first
adopted in Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention,148 but is also addressed
in other international instruments that bind Italy to abide by it. Under Art.
19 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights “[n]o one may be removed,
expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”149 Art. 3 of the European Convention
146. Italy: submission to the united nations committee against torture, 62nd session, 6
November - 6 December 2017, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.am
nesty.org/en/documents/eur30/7241/2017/en/.
147. Convention on the Status of Refugees, supra note 6.
148. Id.
149. European Union Charter on Fundamental Rights, 26 October 2012, 2012/C
326/02.
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on Human Rights (ECHR) also prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment.150 Lastly, Art. 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR prohibits the
collective expulsion of aliens.151
It is under these last two principles that in 2012, in Hirsi et al. v. Italy,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) condemned Italy’s
refoulement practices.152 The claim for violations of Art. 3 and Art. 4 of
Protocol 4 was brought to the ECtHR by eleven Eritreans and thirteen
Somalis who were part of a larger group of people stopped at sea by the
Italian Guardia Costiera while trying to reach the Italian coast.153 After
being intercepted in international waters, the three boats containing about
two hundred people were returned to Tripoli.154 The Italian authorities did
not investigate the identity of the migrants stopped or whether they wanted
to ask for asylum; instead, they took the migrants’ personal belongings,
including their identification documents.155 Even if intercepted in
international waters, the ECtHR found that Italy’s jurisdiction applied to
the individuals stopped the moment they engaged in the refoulement of the
migrants, and thus held Italy responsible for failing to uphold the principles
outlined in the ECHR.156
In reaching its conclusion, the ECtHR took into consideration the fact
that Italy returned the migrants to Libya, a country that it knew, thanks to
the extensive amount of reports from international organizations, would
expose these individuals to degrading treatment, and potentially return
them to countries such as Eritrea and Somalia, where human rights
violations are also widespread.157 The existence of agreements between
Libya and Italy that mention the respect of human rights, the Court
stressed, did not on their own guarantee that Libya would comply with
them, especially because it is not party to the ECHR or of the 1951
Convention.158
In fact, because Libya did not ratify the 1951 Convention nor the 1967

150. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
3, June 1, 2010, CETS no. 194.
151. Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights - Prohibition of collective
expulsions of aliens, 30 April 2017, http://www.refworld.org/docid/592be3c84.html.
152. Hirsi et al. v. Italy, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14-17, 60, 63-64, 75, 79 (2012).
153. Id.
154. Bruno Nascimbene, Condanna senza appello della “politica dei respingimenti”?
La sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo Hirsi e altri c. Italia, ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI (2012), http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1202.pdf.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the country lacks an asylum system,
and even the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has had difficulties
operating in the country. Despite its refusal to join these treaties, some
have advanced the argument that Libya is still bound by the principle of
non-refoulement because it has the force of custom and, some argue, even
of jus cogens, meaning that the principle is so widely recognized as to
apply regardless of being or not parties to the relevant treaties. On the one
hand, this argument might be invalidated by the consistent objector
principle, whereby a state that consistently acted in a manner not in
accordance with a legal principle is not bound by customary law. The fact
that Libya signed CAT and, with it, its Art. 3 prohibiting refoulement, on
the other hand, might provide support to the idea that Libya is in fact bound
by this principle, because it already accepted it elsewhere.
In any case, Italy is once again trying to shield itself from international
obligations in delegating authority to Libya.159 In fact, by having Libyan
officials intercept boats and return migrants and refugees alike to the North
African coast, Italy is trying to avoid another sentence like the one in Hirsi.
At the very least, it is undeniable that the conduct of Libyan border patrols
stopping migrants at sea is the exact same one condemned in the 2012
ECtHR case.
State Responsibility
The most compelling argument challenging Italy’s involvement in
Libyan operations at sea and in its detention and return of migrants is that
the agreement may still make Italy accountable for human rights violations
based on State Responsibility principles. In fact, Asgi claimed that Italy
and the EU are delegating migration control practices to Libya, but are still
maintaining control over its operations and de facto violating the principle
of non-refoulement.160
The International Law Commission (ILC) issued the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility,161 which, despite not being treaty law, are widely

159. See Delphine Nakache and Jessica Losier, The European Union Immigration
Agreement with Libya: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jul. 25,
2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/07/25/the-european-union-immigration-agreement-withlibya-out-of-sight-out-of-mind/ (“The new agreement is smarter, since pushback operations
are now being transferred to Libyan authorities, which means that the Italian authorities will
not bear direct responsibility for the overwhelming evidence of brutality against migrants in
Libya.”).
160. ASGI: the EU and Italy de facto violate the principle of non-refoulement, ASGI
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.asgi.it/english/libya-eu-italy-asylum-migration/.
161. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 43 (2001).
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accepted by the international community as customary law.162 In Art. 2, the
ILC outlined how a state is directly responsible for its wrongful acts, and
that is “when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable
to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the State.”
In the commentary of Chapter IV of the ILC Draft articles, it is
explained that, while each state is responsible for its own wrongful acts and
violations of international law, there are situations in which “internationally
wrongful conduct [..] results from the collaboration of several States rather
than of one State acting alone.”163 In fact, even if not held directly
accountable, Italy may still be responsible for wrongful acts when it “aids
or assists” in the commission of an internationally wrongful act or exercises
“direction and control” over the commission of an internationally wrongful
act if “(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally
wrongful if committed by that State.”164 Therefore, Italy could be held
responsible for wrongful acts if either its own officials or government
agencies are directly involved in violations of international instruments, or
if it “aids or assists” Libya in committing an internationally wrongful act or
it “directs or controls” the commission of an internationally wrongful act.
If the Italian Guardia Costiera or other Italian authorities engaged
directly in the refoulement of migrants, Italy could be held directly
responsible for those wrongful acts, because it is in violation of
international instruments that it ratified. This is reinforced by the ruling of
the ECtHR in Hirsi, and is probably the reason why Italy has been avoiding
such conduct and delegating the job to Libya.
However, when Italy provides Libyan authorities with vessels and
border patrol instruments to intercept migrants at sea and return them to the
Libyan coast, Italy’s conduct seems to fall squarely within the language of
Art. 16. Italy is in fact supplying Libya with all the necessary means to
block migrants and then either detain them in conditions that violate basic
human rights or return them to countries where they could be harmed,
aiding and assisting Libya in perpetrating international law violations.
Italy is well aware that Libya is committing the violations, satisfying
Art. 16 (a). This is particularly true given the number of reports on human
rights conditions in the country that are available and given the discussion
between the Committee Against Torture and Italian representatives where
Italy displayed awareness of the situation. The requirement under Art. 16
162. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, RICHARD ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS 763 (6th ed. 2010).
163. ILC Draft Articles, supra at 161.
164. Id. arts. 16-17.
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(b) is also satisfied in that if Italy were to commit these acts itself, it would
be violating the principles of non-refoulement expressed in CAT, in the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees, as well as human
rights laws expressed in European Human Rights treaties. Therefore, even
if Libya is the state directly engaging in the illegal conduct. Italy might still
have to take at least a share of the blame under State Responsibility
principles, even though only to the extent of the assistance given.165
In addition, it can be argued that Italy’s conduct rises to the level of
“direction and control” identified under Art. 17 of the ILC Draft Articles; if
that is the case, Italy could be held responsible for the wrongful act itself.
According to the article’s commentary:
“the term “controls” refers to cases of domination over the
commission of wrongful conduct and not simply the exercise of
oversight, still less mere influence or concern. Similarly, the word
“directs” does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion but
rather connotes actual direction of an operative kind.”166
Italy’s financial and logistical assistance to Libya in its interception,
detention, and forcible return operations is likely to be more significant
than oversight or “mere influence.” Heavier evidence, other than the
financial support, of close control or direction might be needed, however,
in order to prove Italy’s responsibility for Libya’s wrongful conduct.
In Nicaragua v. US, the International Court of Justice applied the
“effective control” test to decide whether to attribute the wrongful acts of a
Nicaraguan paramilitary group, the contras, to the U.S., which was
assisting them financially and equipping them with weapons.167 The court
held that the U.S. did not have “effective control” because it did not
directly instruct the contras as to the specific operations in which violations
occurred.168 The same test was applied in Bosnia v. Serbia, where the
International Court of Justice decided that the genocide committed in
Srebrenica could not be attributed to Serbia.169 None of the armed groups
involved, the court held, was so completely dependent on Serbia as to
warrant attribution, regardless of the financial, political, military, and
165. See Commentary to Art. 17 of the ILC Draft Articles, supra at 161.
166. Commentary (7) to Art.17, ILC Draft Articles, supra note 161.
167. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
168. Id.
169. Case Concerning Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J.
43, ¶ 395 (Feb. 26).
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logistical relations between them.170 A similar, yet less narrow test, was
applied in Prosecutor v. Tadić.171 Under the “overall control” test, the state
needs to wield overall control over the group, not merely by equipping and
financing it, but by “coordinating or helping in the general planning” of its
operations.172
Though these tests were developed in relation to the conduct of
individuals or groups to be attributed to states, they may still be relevant in
the situation of a state’s conduct in connection to the wrongful acts of
another state. It seems, therefore, that under both the overall control and
the effective control tests Italy’s financial and logistical assistance to Libya
may not be sufficient to hold the country responsible for the wrongful acts.
If, however, more evidence exists as to Italy’s coordinating and planning
Libya’s operations, Italy’s conduct could fall under Art. 17, meaning that it
would then be directly responsible for Libya’s violations of international
law.
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
There are six circumstances identified under the ILC Draft articles that
could justify or serve as defenses for a country’s wrongful conduct,
relieving it of its responsibility under international law in a specific
situation. Only two, however, could realistically come into play in Italy’s
case. The first circumstance is force majeure, which, under Art. 23 is the
“occurrence of an irresistible force or unforeseen event beyond the control
of the state making it impossible for the state to avoid the wrongful act.”173
Italy could, for example, claim that the current migratory crisis or the
enormous loss of lives at sea due to the crossings present a situation of
force majeure justifying financing Libya to keep migrants within its
borders. In New Zealand v. France, however, the ad-hoc France-New
Zealand Arbitration Tribunal held that this circumstance occurs when it
really is “materially impossible” for a state to comply with its international
obligations, and it usually refers to involuntary and unintentional
conduct.174 Italy cooperating with Libyan authorities to return migrants is
anything but involuntary conduct, and it is unlikely that any court would
find it materially impossible for Italy to avoid engaging in it.
Another justification is that of the state of necessity, which is invoked
170. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, supra note 169.
171. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 73-75, 106, 115,
290, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
172. Id. ¶ 131.
173. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 161, art. 23.
174. Rainbow Warrior France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82
I.L.R. 499, 551-64 (Fr.-Nz. Arb. Trib. 1990).
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“for a state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
peril and does not seriously impair an essential interest of the state or of the
international community.”175 Italy could thus argue its essential interest is
preserving its national security against burdensome migration flows.
However, the easy counterargument to this idea is that Italy’s conduct
impairs the international community’s interest to protect refugees and
human rights, which is evidenced by the large number of international
covenants to safeguard these principles.

Italy’s Alternatives to Avoid Responsibility for Wrongful Acts
If Italy wants to pursue its commitments under the MoU without
incurring responsibility for Libya’s wrongful acts, it should then take active
steps to prevent them. On the one hand, Italy could promote a
counterbalancing policy by providing a legal route for people in need of
international protection. These “humanitarian corridors” would ensure that
those with credible claims for asylum receive the assistance they need
under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and prevent their
refoulement to their countries of origin. Most importantly, they would
provide migrants with a not only legal but also safer alternative to paying
smugglers and human traffickers to cross the Mediterranean and risk their
lives.
On the other hand, Italy could condition its funds on Libya’s
compliance with international human rights. Even if Libya has not ratified
certain international treaties, nothing prevents Italy from requiring Libya to
increase its human rights standards in detention centers. Italy could also
provide human rights trainings to Libyan officials and ensure that the
funding it is making available to Libya for its detention centers is used to
improve detention conditions rather than for their expansion. Ideally, Italy
could use its economic influence over Libya also to have it sign the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol or at least put an asylum system in
place.
Even if these projects are implemented, however, the issue remains
that Libya is a politically fragmented state and that discrimination is
widespread, creating dangerous conditions for migrants regardless of
Italy’s efforts. However, Italy’s claimed development operations in the
country might very well help improve this difficult situation. In any case,
Italy has sufficient leverage to demand that Libya at least improves its
compliance with basic human rights standards, and it has an interest in
doing so to prevent being held responsible for internationally wrongful
acts.
175.

ILC Draft Articles, supra note 161, art. 25.
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Conclusion
Italy is a party to numerous international human rights conventions,
some of which are not mentioned in this article. It has an obligation,
therefore, to engage in conduct that upholds those rights. By agreeing to
support Libya in operations of refoulement and in the detention of
economic migrants and refugees alike in subpar conditions, Italy risks
breaching its obligations. Following Hirsi et al. v. Italy, it is clear that Italy
may not directly engage in the forcible return of individuals without
committing a violation against EU human rights treaties. In addition,
despite not directly violating CAT or the Refugee Convention or Protocol
and their principle of non-refoulement, Italy may still be held responsible,
even if just in part, for Libya’s unlawful conduct because of Italy’s
significant assistance and support to Libyan operations. In order to avoid
being held accountable for Libya’s wrongful acts, Italy needs to push for a
significant shift in its cooperation with Libya. This could most effectively
occur by conditioning its funds to Libya on Libya’s commitment to respect
human rights and stop returning individuals to countries where they may be
harmed. If this shift were not to occur, Italy would fail its commitment to
the respect of human rights, the prohibition against torture, and the
protection of refugees which it promised decades ago, and it would do so
solely to stop waves of migrants that will likely continue to arrive through
other routes with or without an agreement with Libya.

